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MUNICIPALITIES-EXCLUSIONARY
DINANCES FAILING TO

ZONING-CONSTITUTIONALITY-OR-

PROVIDE FOR TOWNHOUSES-The Pennsylva-

nia Supreme Court, applying the Surrick test, has held that a municipality can meet its fair share obligation by providing for some
form or forms of multi-family dwellings, but a municipality need

not provide for every conceivable subcategory of such dwellings.
In re Appeal of Elocin, Inc., 501 Pa. 348, 461 A.2d 771 (1983).
On January 9, 1976, Elocin Inc. (Elocin) filed two curative
amendment applications with the Board of Commissioners of
Springfield Township for the purpose of proceeding with a development proposal on a certain tract of land (Elocin Tract).1 Elocin
challenged the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance for its failure to provide for Springfield's "fair share" of the region's need for
multi-family dwellings, specifically apartments and townhouses.2

After thirty-eight public hearings were held to consider Elocin's
challenges and proposed curative amendments, the Board of Com-

missioners denied the curative amendments on November 9, 1978.1
Elocin appealed this decision to the Delaware County Court of
Common Pleas, which took no further evidence" and upheld the
1. In re Appeal of Elocin, Inc., 66 Pa. Commw. 28, 30, 443 A.2d 1334, 1335 (1982).
Elocin owned a sixty-four acre tract of land in Springfield Township, Delaware County, near
the city of Philadelphia. Evidence introduced at hearings before the Board of Commissioners indicated that the tract was rugged in nature, with slopes in excess of 15% covering 31%
of the tract. Sixty-two percent of the tract was under heavy tree cover, 18.8% was within a
100-year flood plain, and 8.4% was in an area of high water table. Elocin's development plan
proposed construction of 567 apartment units in six-story high structures and 305
townhouse units in a variety of clusters. In re Appeal of Elocin, Inc., 501 Pa. 348, 350-51,
461 A.2d 771, 772 (1983).
2. 66 Pa. Commw. at 29, 445 A.2d at 1334. The Elocin Tract was located in an "Aresidence" district, where the only type of residence permitted was a single-family detached
home. The governing zoning ordinance provided for other districts in which semi-detached
homes, two-family homes and apartment houses were permitted. Apartment houses could

contain no more than four units; be of no more than two stories; and could not exceed
thirty-five feet in height. The ordinance made no provision for townhouses or mid- or highrise apartments. Evidence introduced before the Board of Commissioners established that
about twelve percent of the housing stock in Springfield Township was in multi-family
dwellings in the form of twin homes or apartments. Springfield contained approximately 160
acres of undeveloped land, which was about four percent of the total land area of the Township. 501 Pa. at 350-51, 461 A.2d at 772.
3. 66 Pa. Commw. at 30, 443 A.2d at 1335.
4. Id. The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, citing Lower Gwynedd Township v. Provincial Investment Co., 39 Pa. Commw. 546, 549, 395 A.2d 1055, 1056 (1979), took
no further evidence and confined its review to a determination of whether the board abused
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decision of the Board of Commissioners.5 In April of 1982, the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reversed, holding that the zoning ordinance was invalid, and remanded the case to the Court of
Common Pleas for consideration of the reasonableness of Elocin's
development proposal.6 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
granted cross petitions for allowance of appeal by both Springfield
Township and Elocin.7
The opinion of the court was delivered by Justice Zappala.8 Justice Zappala determined that the issue before the court was
whether the ordinance was unconstitutionally exclusionary.9 In reversing the order of the commonwealth court, and reinstating the
order of the court of common pleas, the supreme court held that
where a municipal zoning scheme provides for a reasonable share
of multi-family dwelling units, it need not provide for every conceivable subcategory of such dwellings. 10 Elocin argued that townhouses and mid- and high-rise apartments are legitimate uses and
that the ordinance was unconstitutionally exclusionary in failing to
make provision for such uses. 1
The Elocin court first addressed the constitutionality of excluding legitimate land uses.1 2 The court relied on National Land and
Investment Company v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment,' 8 in which the supreme court held a zoning ordinance unconstitutional which imposed a four-acre minimum lot size on certain
its discretion, committed an error of law, or made findings of fact not supported by substantial evidence. 66 Pa. Commw. at 30 n.3, 443 A.2d at 1335 n.3.
5. Id.
6. 501 Pa. at 350, 461 A.2d at 772.
7. Id. Springfield Township sought to reinstate the order of the court of common
pleas, and Elocin sought definitive relief without the necessity of a remand. Id.
8. Id. Justice Zappala was joined in the plurality opinion by Justices Roberts and
McDermott; Justice Flaherty concurred in the result; Justices Nix and Hutchinson each
filed dissenting and concurring opinions; Justice Larsen dissented. Id. at 354, 461 A.2d at
774.
9. Id. at 351, 461 A.2d at 772. Justice Zappala stated that a zoning ordinance is unconstitutionally exclusionary when it does not make reasonable allowance for legitimate
uses. Id.
10. Id. at 353, 461 A.2d at 773. The court, citing Appeal of Kravitz, 501 Pa. 200, 460
A.2d 1075 (1983), noted that in the latter decision it was held that a municipality need not
provide for every conceivable use, noting also that the Kravitz analysis was controlling. Id.
at 353, 461 A.2d at 773.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 351, 461 A.2d at 772.
13. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). Justice Zappala noted that National Land held
that a minimum lot size requirement was not unconstitutional per se, but unconstitutional
when a municipality failed to advance a legitimate argument to sustain the limitation. 501
Pa. at 351, 461 A.2d at 772.
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residential districts when the municipality had not advanced a legitimate interest to sustain the limitation."
The court next addressed the standard applied to an ordinance
that completely bans a particular use from a municipality. 6 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had clarified the law regarding the
standard to be applied for a complete exclusion in Exton Quarries,
Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment. 6 The court in Exton Quarries held that a zoning ordinance which totally excludes a particular use from the entire municipality must bear a more substantial
relationship to the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare than an ordinance which merely confines that use to a certain
7
area in the municipality.'
Turning its attention to the housing demand aspect of the exclusionary zoning issue, the court discussed Girsh Appeal,", in which
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held that a municipality
must bear its rightful part of the burden of population growth
when the municipality was a logical place for development.1 9 Justice Zappala next discussed Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale
Farms, Inc.,20 a later zoning case, in which the court held that a
township was required to provide a fair share of land for apartments.2 ' Finally, relying on Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board of
14. 419 Pa. at 522, 215 A.2d at 607. The National Land court also held that zoning
was a tool of local government bodies which enables them to more effectively meet the demands of governing communities, and was not to be used as a means to avoid the responsibilities and economic burdens of population growth. Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
15. 501 Pa. at 351, 461 A.2d at 772. Justice Zappala cited Norate Corp. v. Zoning
Board of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 397, 207 A.2d 890 (1965), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court struck down an ordinance that completely banned off-size signs for advertising, and
Ammon R. Smith Auto Co. Appeal, 423 Pa. 493, 223 A.2d 683 (1966), in which the court

declared unconstitutional an ordinance which completely banned flashing lights. 501 Pa. at
351, 461 A.2d at 772.
16. 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967).
17. Id. at 60, 228 A.2d at 179. Justice Zappala noted that in Exton Quarries the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down a zoning ordinance which completely excluded quarrying in a sparsely populated and undeveloped municipality. 501 Pa. at 351, 461 A.2d at 772.
18. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
19. 501 Pa. at 352, 461 A.2d at 773. See Girsh, 437 Pa. at 244-45, 263 A.2d at 398-99.
The Elocin court acknowledged that in Girsh, although apartments were not explicitly
banned, the ordinance was held to be unconstitutionally exclusionary because it failed to
provide for a legitimate use. 501 Pa. at 352, 461 A.2d at 773.
20. 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
21. 501 Pa. at 352, 461 A.2d at 773. See Willistown, 462 Pa. at 449-50, 341 A.2d at 468.
The Elocin court pointed out that in Willistown the ordinance was declared unconstitutionally exclusionary for making provisions only for apartment units on eight of 11,589 acres in
the township. 501 Pa. at 352, 461 A.2d at 773.
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the Township of Upper Providence,2 Justice Zappala outlined the
"fair share" test, 23 wherein a determination is made of whether the
zoning scheme reflects a balanced consideration of regional needs
and development. Justice Zappala pointed out that Surrick held
that it is necessary to inquire into whether the municipality is a
logical area for population growth, whether the municipality is already highly developed, and the effect the zoning ordinance has on
the availability of multi-family dwellings, that is, whether the exclusion is total or partial.2 4
Applying the test of Surrick, the court first found that Springfield was not a logical area for development and growth because
most of the land in the township was already developed. 25 Turning
to the second part of the test, the court found that Springfield's
current percentage of multi-family dwelling units satisfied the fair
share doctrine since twelve percent of its housing stock was in
multi-family dwellings. 26 As a further indication that the fair share
test was satisfied, Justice Zappala noted the natural features of the
Elocin Tract and concluded that the site was unsuitable for the
type of development proposed. Addressing the third element of
the Surrick fair share test, the court determined that the exclusion
was partial, and that the ordinance had very little effect on the
availability of multi-family dwellings in Springfield. 2 The court
noted that the analysis of Appeal of Kravitz was controlling, and
held that a municipality can meet its fair share obligation by pro22. 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977).
23. 501 Pa. at 352, 461 A.2d at 773. See Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Appeal Board of
the Township of Upper Providence, 476 Pa. at 191-92, 382 A.2d at 110 (1978). Justice Zappala acknowledged that in Surrick, the supreme court held that a court must look to
whether the zoning scheme reflects a balanced consideration of regional needs and development when determining whether the land use regulations meet the legitimate needs of all
categories of people who desire to live within the municipality. 501 Pa. at 352, 461 A.2d at
773.
24. Id.
25. Id. The court pointed out that since the township had grown and developed significantly in recent decades, only four percent of its land area remained undeveloped. Id.
26. Id. The court determined that 12% of the housing stock in multi-family dwellings
was a fair share of the township's land based upon the current low level of development
activity and the small amount of undeveloped land which remained in the township. Id. at
353, 461 A.2d at 773. See also supra note 2.
27. Id. Since the site was unsuitable for multi-family dwellings, see supra note 1, refusal to allow the proposed development was reasonably related to the public health, safety
and welfare of Springfield residents, and thus the court found that the ordinance was not
unconstitutionally exclusionary. 501 Pa. at 353, 461 A.2d at 773.
28. Id. The exclusion was found to be partial rather than total because the zoning
ordinance provided for some specified form of multi-family dwellings in some parts of
Springfield Township. Id.
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viding for some form or forms of multi-family dwellings, but need
not provide for every conceivable subcategory of such dwellings.2 9
In their concurring opinions Justices Nix and Hutchinson indicated that they would remand the case to the court of common
pleas for consideration of the reasonableness of the Elocin Tract
for the proposed development.3 0
In the dissenting portion of his opinion, Justice Nix criticized
that portion of the plurality opinion which upheld the constitutionality of the total exclusion of townhouses."' Justice Nix contended that a proper application of the fair share test announced
in Surrick suggested that Springfield Township was not so highly
developed that it could escape its constitutional obligation to make
available a "fair share" of its area for affordable housing for persons in search of such housing.3 2 Relying on the argument that
townhouses provide a distinct legitimate use, Justice Nix contended that the ordinance foreclosed the option of this less expensive form of housing and thus constituted a total rather than partial exclusion. 3 Justice Nix then addressed the issues of whether
Springfield Township was a logical place for development, and its
degree of development, noting that Springfield was a convenient
Philadelphia suburb with a present population density below average for Delaware County and with a projected population growth
3 4
that was significant.
Relying heavily on his dissent in Kravitz, Justice Hutchinson argued that townhouses constituted a legitimate means of meeting a
particular demand, and that the Springfield zoning ordinance
could not totally exclude townhouses.3 5 Justice Hutchinson con29. Id. See Appeal of Kravitz, 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075. In Kravitz, the court inquired into the effect of a partial exclusion of multi-family dwellings from the zoning
scheme and found that an exclusion of any particular design type of multi-family dwelling
did not affect population expansion or the availability of multi-family dwellings, and thus
was not unconstitutionally exclusionary. 501 Pa. at 210, 460 A.2d at 1081.
30. 501 Pa. at 355-56, 461 A.2d at 774-75. There was substantial evidence in the record
that Elocin's site was unsuitable for intensive residential development. Id. at 356, 461 A.2d
at 775 (Hutchinson, J., concurring and dissenting). See also supra note 1.
31. Id. at 354, 461 A.2d at 774 (Nix, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 354-55, 461 A.2d at 774 (Nix, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 354, 461 A.2d at 774 (Nix, J., dissenting).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 355, 461 A.2d at 774 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). In Kravitz, Justice Hutchinson pointed out that there was a distinct difference between townhouses and apartment
units. Townhouses have some of the attributes of single-family detached homes, such as the
benefits of privacy, ease of access and open space. Furthermore, he noted that townhouses
can be provided at less cost than single-family detached homes, and therefore provide a
realistic alternative for moderate income persons who want to own a dwelling unit rather
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tended that the fair share test adopted by the court in Surrick,
with its distinction between developing and developed communities, was not applicable where the zoning ordinance failed to provide for a distinct legitimate use. 6 In his dissenting opinion in
Kravitz, Justice Hutchinson had argued that in situations involving the total prohibition of otherwise legitimate land uses, the validity of the ban could only be sustained if the municipality
presented evidence to establish that there was a substantial interest served by the regulation. 7 Justice Hutchinson concluded his
dissent in Kravitz by stating that the total exclusion of townhouses
from a municipality cannot be justified by simply concluding that
the township was not in the path of development under the fair
share test set forth in Willistown and Surrick.ss
The critical issues raised by the Elocin decision are whether
Springfield's zoning ordinance was in fact exclusionary, and
whether the court accurately applied the three factor "fair share"
test set forth in Surrick.3 9 According to the Surrick test, the initial
than rent an apartment. See Kravitz, 501 Pa. at 219, 460 A.2d at 1085.
36. Elocin, 501 Pa. at 355-56, 461 A.2d at 774-75 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). Justice
Hutchinson based this opinion on his dissent in Kravitz. In Kravitz he stated that the
threshold consideration in the fair share test-that the municipality is in the path of development-implies that a community may exclude townhouses if it is not in the path of development, even if the exclusion lacks the requisite substantial relationship to health, safety or
general morals of the community. 501 Pa. at 222, 460 A.2d at 1087.
37. Id. at 220-21, 460 A.2d at 1086.
38. Id. at 221-22, 460 A.2d at 1086-87. See infra note 39.
39. The Elocin court had acknowledged that it was bound to the Surrick analysis in
its consideration of the validity of the zoning ordinances. 501 Pa. at 352, 461 A.2d at 778.
The Surrick court's instructions with respect to the relevant factors to be considered when
conducting a review of zoning ordinances alleged to be exclusionary constitute a synthesis of
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions beginning with National Land and Investment Co. v.
Easttown Township Board of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). When reviewing zoning ordinances for constitutional validity courts are, under National Land, charged
with determining whether the ordinance under question bears a substantial relationship to
the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community. Id. at 504, 522, 215 A.2d
597, 607. Thus, in the words of the Surrick court: "[W]ithout expressly labeling it as such,
the court has employed substantive due process analysis in reviewing zoning schemes and
has concluded implicitly that exclusionary zoning techniques do not have the requisite substantial relationship to the public welfare." Surrick, 476 Pa. at 188, 382 A.2d at 108. The
implication of National Land is that communities must deal with population growth and
may not ignore the future by instituting zoning regulations that effectively limit the community's population to near present levels. See Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms,
Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 449, 341 A.2d 466, 468 (quoting Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466,
268 A.2d 765 (1970)). In Surrick, the court relied on Willistown and reaffirmed its conviction that suburban communities which find themselves in the path of developmental pressure cannot establish residential enclaves by excluding population growth. See Surrick, 476
Pa. at 188, 382 A.2d at 108. According to Surrick, the court's ruling in Willistown rested
upon the premise of Girsh Appeal that where a municipal subdivision "is a logical place for
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inquiry must focus upon whether the community in question is a
logical area for development and population growth.4 0 In determining whether a community constitutes such an area, the community's proximity to a large metropolis and the community's and region's projected population growth are factors to be considered."
Once a court has determined that a particular community is in the
path of development, the present level of development must be analyzed by examining the population density, the percentage of total undeveloped land and the percentage of land available for the
development of multi-family dwellings.'2 The third level of inquiry,
which focuses upon the ordinance's exclusionary impact on the
community, can be resolved by once again examining the percentage of the community's land available under the zoning ordinance
for multi-family dwellings. 43 This percentage must be considered in
light of current population growth pressure within both the community and the region, and in view of the total amount of undeveloped land in the community."
It now remains to apply the analytical matrix adopted by Surrick to the facts of Elocin to determine whether the ordinance in
question reflects a proper consideration of the three part "fair
share" test. The first question for consideration is whether Springfield Township was a logical area for development and population
growth.45 With reference to the community's proximity to a large
metropolis, Springfield Township is located 5.2 miles from Phila'development, it must bear its rightful part of the burden." Id. at 189, 382 A.2d at 108. See
Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 244-45, 263 A.2d 395, 398-99.
The Surrick court maintained that Willistown also established the more basic proposition
that a political subdivision cannot ignore the housing needs of the areas surrounding it. See
Surrick, 476 Pa. at 188, 382 A.2d at 108. To implement these concepts, the court adopted
the "fair share" principle first established by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975)
(Mt. Laurel 1). Id. The Surrick court pointed out that Mt. Laurel I required local political
units to plan for and provide land use regulations which meet the legitimate needs of all
classes of the population who may desire to live within its boundaries. 476 Pa. at 190, 382
A.2d at 109.
40. Id. at 192, 382 A.2d at 110.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 194, 382 A.2d at 111. According to the Surrick analysis of the impact of the
zoning ordinance, the extent of the exclusion, if any, must be considered. The basic question
to be resolved during this inquiry is whether the ordinance results in a total or partial exclusion of multi-family dwellings. Id. at 194, 382 A.2d at 111.
44. Id. The Surrick court pointed out that where the amount of land set aside for
multi-family dwellings is disproportionately small in relation to the total amount of undeveloped land, the ordinance will be held exclusionary. Id.
45. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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delphia; is bisected by two major highway arterials (one of which,
Route 1, is a direct link to the city); and is located on a commuter
rail line.4 In spite of these facts, the Elocin court found Springfield Township not to be a logical area for development.4 7 The
court seemingly ignored the township's proximity to a large metropolitan area, and the fact that it was located adjacent to Upper
Providence and Nether Providence Townships, two communities
which were previously determined to be in the path of development.4 8 Nether Providence Township, located just southwest of
Springfield, was the subject area of the exclusionary zoning issue
discussed in Girsh Appeal,4 9 and Upper Providence Township,
which is located to the northwest, was the area under consideration
in Surrick.50 The court in Surrick concluded that Upper Providence was a logical area for development, as indicated by the fact
that it was located a mere twelve miles from Philadelphia and situated at the intersection of two main traffic arteries, one of which
was Route 1"' In Elocin, however, no consideration of the location
factor was afforded, and the court's finding that Springfield was
not a logical area for development seems to be based entirely upon
the township's present level of development.5 2 The supreme court
in Surrick noted that analytically the question of development
could be included in this initial inquiry, but that for the sake of
simplicity it would be considered a separate step in the analytical
matrix.8
The second question to consider, according to the Surrick
formula, is the present level of development within the community,
46. 66 Pa. Commw. at 31, 443 A.2d at 1335.
47. 501 Pa. at 353, 461 A.2d at 773.
48. 66 Pa. Commw. at 31, 443 A.2d at 1335.
49. See 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395.
50. See 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105.
51. Id. at 186-87, 382 A.2d at 107.
52. 501 Pa. at 352, 461 A.2d at 773. The Elocin court determined that Springfield
Township was an area that had experienced growth in population in recent decades, but its
development had reached a high level and covered most of its land area. Id. See supra notes
2 & 25. See also infra note 56.
53. 476 Pa. at 192 n.9, 382 A.2d at 110 n.9. In the court's words:
Analytically, the present level of community development could be included under
the initial inquiry as to whether a community was a logical area for population
growth and development. Commentators have noted, and probably correctly so, that
a particular community might be along a corridor of population expansion but already be so highly developed that it cannot properly be called a developing
community.
Id. See generally Ackerman, The Mount Laurel Decision: Expanding the Boundaries of
Zoning Reform, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 13-15.
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which involves a consideration of population density data, percentage of total undeveloped land and the percentage of land available
for the development of multi-family uses.5 This inquiry involves a
determination with respect to whether Springfield Township was
still "developing" and therefore subject to the "fair share" test, or
whether it had developed to the point that it was not subject to an
exclusionary zoning challenge.55 The court in Elocin concluded
that Springfield Township had met its fair share obligation given
that twelve percent of its housing units were in multi-family dwellings, and the fact that only a small percentage of land in the township remained undeveloped."
With regard to this second inquiry, it should be noted that the
commonwealth court in Appeal of Silver,57 applying the Surrick
criteria on this question, used 100% as the point of development
capacity. 58 Thus, although Springfield Township had only 160
acres or four percent of its land area vacant, according to the approach in Silver the township had not reached such a highly developed stage that it could avoid its fair share obligation.5 9 Additionally, of the approximately 4000 acres in Springfield Township, only
29 acres, or about .73% was zoned for multi-family use. 60 While
the court in Elocin concluded that twelve percent of Springfield's
housing stock was in multi-family units, a large portion of these
units included nonconforming uses, and their existence does not
cure any defect in the zoning ordinance. 6 It was recognized in
Girsh that a failure to make provision for a given use anywhere
within the township was legally equivalent to an express prohibition of such use. 2 Further, the Girsh court stated that to include
prohibited uses which have come about as a result of a variance
54. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
55. 66 Pa. Commw. at 33, 443 A.2d at 1336.
56. 501 Pa. at 352-53, 461 A.2d at 773. Findings of fact before the Board of Commissioners established that of the 4000 acres which make up Springfield Township, approximately 160 acres were vacant. Thus, only four percent of the land was vacant, with 96%
subjected to some use. 66 Pa. Commw. at 32, 443 A.2d at 1336.
57. 35 Pa. Commw. 569, 387 A.2d 169 (1978).
58. Id. at 573-74, 387 A.2d at 171-72.
59. See Elocin, 66 Pa. Commw. at 33-34, 443 A.2d at 1336.
60. Id. at 34, 443 A.2d at 1337.
61. Id. at n.6. See Lower Gwynedd Township v. Providence Investment Co., 39 Pa.
Commw. 546, 395 A.2d 1055 (1979). In Lower Gwynedd, the court determined that 524 twin
home units existed as non-conforming uses, rather than as a matter of right. Their existence, therefore, was held not to cure any defect in the ordinance. Id. at 550, 395 A.2d at
1057.
62. Girsh, 437 Pa. at 241, 263 A.2d at 397.
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distorts the issue as to whether a township has made provision for
the use as part of its plan of development."
Based on the facts discussed thus far the question of Springfield's current level of development is admittedly a difficult one,
but additional facts, garnered from Elocin's appeal to the commonwealth court, indicate that Springfield was a developing community and should have been obligated to absorb its fair share of future growth. In the 1930's and 1940's the township had zoned up to
5.3% of its land for multi-family uses, but as the population increased Springfield undertook more restrictions upon types of uses
in the district." By the end of the 1960's, density restrictions were
placed upon apartment use; townhouses were not a permitted use;
and the apartment district was reduced to its present 29 acres. 5 As
a result of the zoning scheme, Springfield locked itself into its past
level (or rate) of development, accomplishing exactly what the
6 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court sought to discourage in Girsh.
court in Girsh concluded that "a township may not choose to only
take as many people as can live in single family housing, in effect
freezing the population at near present levels. ' 6 7 This proscription
on local communities which attempts to restrict population levels
was first addressed in National Land, in which the supreme court
stated that "a zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid burdens, economic and otherwise . . . cannot be held valid." 68
It should also be noted that the plurality opinion in Elocin
makes no mention of Springfield's present population density and
projected population increase. Justice Nix, however, in his dissenting opinion, describes Springfield Township as a convenient Philadelphia suburb with a present population density below average
for Delaware County, but a projected population growth that is
significant." Thus, a proper analysis of Springfield's present level
of development, under the test announced in Surrick, requires the
conclusion that Springfield Township is not so highly developed
that is may avoid its responsibility to make available a "fair share"
63.
64.

Id. at 242, 263 A.2d at 397.
66 Pa. Commw. at 34, 443 A.2d at 1337.

65.

Id.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 34-35, 443 A.2d at
437 Pa. at 244, 263 A.2d
419 Pa. at 532, 215 A.2d
501 Pa. at 355, 461 A.2d

1337.
at 398.
at 612.
at 774 (Nix, J., dissenting).
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of its area for townhouse development."0
The final focus of inquiry set forth in Surrick involves a determination of whether the challenged zoning scheme effects an exclu-

sionary result. 71 In analyzing the effect of a zoning ordinance, the

extent of the exclusion, if any, must be considered; that is, whether
the exclusion is partial or total.7 2 The plurality in Elocin determined that the exclusion of townhouses was partial, rather than
total, because the zoning ordinance provided for some specified
form of multi-family dwellings, in this instance apartments. 7 Relying on its decision in Kravitz, the plurality in Elocin concluded
that a municipality can meet its fair share obligation by providing
for some form or forms of multi-family dwellings, but does not
have to provide for every possible subcategory of multi-family
74
dwellings.

In Kravitz the court declared that the pivotal question is
"whether a community must affirmatively provide for a particular
architectural design in its plan for development.

75

The Kravitz

court concluded that no Pennsylvania Supreme Court case had
ever held that a municipal zoning ordinance must "affirmatively"
provide for a specific use, and further pointed out that the Exton
Quarries holding is limited to zoning cases where the ordinance
prohibits legitimate business uses.7 6 The plurality opinion in Kravitz attempted to explain that Girsh, which applies the Exton
Quarries rationale to residences, held that "ordinances which fail
to provide for a particular use [are] unreasonable only if they exclude population growth generally," and not because the ordinance
failed to provide for a particular use. 7 In so distinguishing Girsh,
the Kravitz court trivialized the influence which Exton Quarries
70. Id.
71. See supra notes 43 & 44 and accompanying text.
72. Surrick, 476 Pa. at 194, 382 A.2d at 111. Surrick acknowledged that if the zoning
exclusion is partial, the question of the ordinance's validity is more complicated than a situation where the exclusion is total. Id.
73. Elocin, 501 Pa. at 353, 461 A.2d at 773.
74. Id.
75. Kravitz, 501 Pa. at 211, 460 A.2d at 1081.
76. Id. See Exton Quarries,425 Pa. at 59, 228 A.2d at 179. In Kravitz the court stated
that the constitutionality of zoning ordinances which totally prohibit legitimate businesses
such as quarrying from an entire community should be regarded with particular circumspection; for unlike the constitutionality of most restrictions on property rights imposed by
other ordinances, the constitutionality of total prohibitions of legitimate businesses "cannot
be premised on the fundamental reasonableness of allocating to each type of activity a particular location in the community." 501 Pa. at 211, 460 A.2d at 1081.
77. Id. at 209, 460 A.2d at 1081.
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had on Girsh and effectively overruled Camp Hill Development
Company, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment 7s and Appeal of
Olson,79 two commonwealth court decisions which abide by the
Girsh concept that it is unlawful to exclude legitimate uses. In
Camp Hill the commonwealth court interpreted Girsh to hold that
a regulation which totally prohibits a legitimate residential use for
which there is a demand is unconstitutional."0 Consequently, the
Camp Hill court determined that a total prohibition of townhouses
was likewise unconstitutional.81 The following year, in Appeal of
Olson, the commonwealth court reiterated the Camp Hill holding
that townhouses constitute a legitimate and accepted form of development entitled to the same recognition which was accorded to
apartments by the supreme court in Girsh 2 Until Kravitz there
had been no indication by the supreme court that it disagreed with
the Camp Hill and Olson analyses. 8 Indeed, the court recognized
in Girsh that failure to make provision for a given use was legally
equivalent to an express prohibition of such use. 4
In contrast to the strained reasoning of the plurality opinion in
Kravitz and Elocin, Justice Hutchinson's dissent in both cases appears to be more consistent with prior decisions. 5 In Kravitz and
Elocin Justice Hutchinson, relying on Girsh and Exton Quarries,
argued that in situations involving the total prohibition of otherwise legitimate land uses, the validity of the ban could only be up78. 13 Pa. Commw. 519, 319 A.2d 197 (1974).
79. 19 Pa. Commw. 514, 338 A.2d 748 (1975).
80. 13 Pa. Commw. 522-24, 319 A.2d at 199-200.
81. Id. at 524, 319 A.2d at 200. The Camp Hill court pointed out that in Rickert Nurseries v. Lower Makefield Zoning Hearing Board, 24 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 201 (1973), the
Bucks County Common Pleas Court stated that cluster style attached townhouses... [are]
now a recognized and established form of residential development, having a relevant place
in, and carrying out appropriate functions with respect to, the housing facilities contemplated by modern municipal planners." Id. at 205, 319 A.2d at 200.
82. 19 Pa. Commw. at 519, 338 A.2d at 750.
83. 501 Pa. at 205, 460 A.2d at 1078. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided only
one zoning case between Surrick and Kravitz, Hopewell Township v. Golda, 499 Pa. 246,
452 A.2d 1337 (1982), a case that did not directly relate to the issues of exclusion, fair share,
or housing types. See id.
84. See Girsh, 437 Pa. at 241, 263 A.2d at 397. See also Township of Willistown v.
Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. at 448, 341 A.2d at 467. In Willistown the court determined that a zoning ordinance which zoned only 80 acres of an 11,589 acre township for
multi-family use was "tokenism", and therefore exclusionary.
85. Compare Kravitz, 501 Pa. at 216-23, 460 A.2d at 1084-87 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting) and Elocin, 501 Pa. at 355-56, 461 A.2d at 774-75 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting) with
National Land, 419 Pa. at 518-33, 215 A.2d at 605-13; Exton Quarries,425 Pa. at 48-65, 228
A.2d at 173-82; Girsh, 437 Pa. at 239-46, 263 A.2d at 396-99; Willistown, 462 Pa. at 447-50,
341 A.2d at 467-69; and Surrick, 476 Pa. at 185-96, 382 A.2d at 106-12.
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held if the municipality presented evidence to establish that there
was a substantial interest served by the regulation.8 This argument is consistent with the commonwealth court application of the
Surrick test as applied in Appeal of Olson, where the ordinance
made no provision for townhouses and the burden was upon the
township to show what public health, welfare and safety interest
the ban on townhouses was intended to protect.8 7 Thus, the proper
application of the third part of the Surrick test, according to
Camp Hill and Appeal of Olson, would have been to conclude that
the ban on townhouses resulted in a total exclusion, and then proceed to determine whether Springfield Township presented sufficient evidence to establish that there was a substantial interest
served by the regulation.8 8 It is significant to note that the commonwealth court in both Camp Hill and Appeal of Olson based its
opinion on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of Beaver
Gasoline Company v. Zoning Hearing Board.89 In Beaver Gasoline, the court first established that in cases involving the total
prohibition of legitimate land uses, the applicant meets the burden
of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality simply by
showing the total ban. 90 Thereafter, according to Beaver Gasoline,
if the municipality is to sustain the validity of the ban, the municipality has the burden of presenting evidence to establish the public
purpose served by the regulation.9
The plurality opinions in Kravitz and Elocin in essence conclude
that townhouses are not legitimate uses. Each opinion arrives at
this conclusion by holding that townhouses are a subcategory of
multi-family use, rather than constituting legitimate uses in and of
themselves.9 2 Justice Hutchinson's dissent in both Kravitz and
86. Compare Kravitz, 501 Pa. at 220-21, 460 A.2d at 1085-86 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting) and Elocin, 501 Pa. at 355, 461 A.2d at 774 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting) with Exton
Quarries,425 Pa. at 58-65, 228 A.2d at 178-82 and Girsh, 437 Pa. at 242-44, 263 A.2d at 397-

98.
87. See Appeal of Olson, 19 Pa. Commw. at 519, 338 A.2d at 750. Since the litigant
succeeded in proving that the ordinance made no provision for townhouses and the township had, in turn, failed to meet its burden, the court held that the ordinance was unconsti-

tutional. Id.
88. Compare Kravitz, 501 Pa. at 203-16, 460 A.2d at 1077-83 and Elocin, 501 Pa. at
350-54, 461 A.2d at 772-74 with Camp Hill, 13 Pa. Commw. at 520-25, 319 A.2d at 198-201
and Appeal of Olson, 19 Pa. Commw. 516-22, 338 A.2d at 748-52.
89. 445 Pa. 571, 285 A.2d 501 (1971).
90. Id. at 577, 285 A.2d at 504-05.
91. Id.
92. See Kravitz, 501 Pa. at 210-11, 460 A.2d at 1080-81. See also Elocin, 501 Pa. at
353, 461 A.2d at 773.
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Elocin, however, is attuned to the fact that townhouses are not
simply a subcategory of multi-family units since townhouses share
some attributes of single-family detached homes.93 Justice Hutchinson based his dissent in Kravitz on the fact that townhouses can
be provided at less cost than a single-family detached home and
can be provided either on a rental or ownership basis, and thus
provide a "realistic alternative" for moderate income persons who
want to own a single-family dwelling rather than rent an apartment unit.9 ' Justice Hutchinson's argument thus strongly implies
that townhouses are much more than just another architectural
type or design.95 This argument directly conflicts with the plurality
opinion in Kravitz in which Justice Zappala determined that the
question to be resolved was whether a community9 6 must affirmatively provide for a particular architectural design.
The major distinction between the plurality opinion in Kravitz
and the dissent of Justice Hutchinson rests on Justice Hutchinson's belief that townhouses provide a realistic alternative for moderate income persons, while the plurality believes that townhouses
are simply another architectural design type which serve no distinct purpose.9 Justice Hutchinson also pointed out that where a
community excludes a legitimate residential use, the community
both violates the rights of property owners to be free from an unreasonable intermeddling with private ownership of property, and
forecloses the interest of that portion of the population looking to
undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place to live.98 Again,
Justice Hutchinson's argument appears to be consistent with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's concern in Willistown, in which
Justice O'Brien, quoting the New Jersey Supreme Court in South93. See Kravitz, 501 Pa. at 219-20, 460 A.2d at 1085 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). See
also Elocin, 501 Pa. at 355, 461 A.2d at 774-75 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
94. Kravitz, 501 Pa. at 219, 460 A.2d' at 1085.
95. Id. at 220, 460 A.2d at 1085.
96. Id. at 211, 460 A.2d at 1081. Justice Hutchinson's dissent in this respect is fully in
line with Appeal of Olson, 19 Pa. Commw. at 519-20, 338 A.2d at 750-51, in which the court
drew a distinction between a residential use (such as apartments, townhouses and mobile
homes) for which municipalities must make provision, and a particular architectural style
which would not be considered a separate residential use classification. The Olson court
recognized that there are so many architectural types or styles of residential housing that it
would be too much of a burden to require a municipality to cover every conceivable design
type in its zoning ordinance. Nevertheless, the court concluded that townhouses were a reasonable, legitimate and recognized residential use which had to be provided for, unless the
municipality could demonstrate that the failure to do so was supported by public health,
welfare or safety considerations. Id.
97. See supra notes 95 & 96 and accompanying text.
98. Id. at 221, 460 A.2d at 1086 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
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ern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, stated
that every municipality must, by its land use regulations, make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing. 9
The Mt. Laurel opinion prescribes that a municipality cannot foreclose the opportunity for low and moderate income housing and its
regulations must affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least to
the present and prospective regional need."'0
As the nation's most urbanized state, New Jersey has a significant and influential jurisprudence on land use issues. 10' While decisions of its highest court are not binding outside New Jersey,
such decisions have been given great weight by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. 02 Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's timing
of the decisions in Kravitz and Elocin is ironic since it comes in
the wake of the New Jersey Supreme Court's announcement on
January 20, 1983, of its decision in Southern Burlington NAACP
v. Mt. Laurel Township (Mt. Laurel I/).10a As discussed above,
Kravitz and Elocin strongly favor the interest of the municipality
in limiting developers' options in providing for a full range of housing types.'10 Under the Mt. Laurel II decision, the municipality
not only has an obligation to remove land use regulation barriers to
the construction of low and moderate income housing, 1 5 but also
99. Compare Kravitz, 501 Pa. at 216-23, 460 A.2d at 1084-87 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting) with Willistown, 462 Pa. at 449, 341 A.2d at 468 (1975). See Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975) (Mt. Laurel I),
in which the court concluded
that every such municipality must, by its land use regulations, presumptively make
realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing. More specifically,
presumptively it cannot foreclose the opportunity of the classes of people mentioned
for low and moderate income housing and its regulations must affirmatively afford
that opportunity, at least to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present
and prospective regional need therefor. These obligations must be met unless the particular municipality can sustain the heavy burden of demonstrating peculiar circumstances which dictate that it should not be required so to do.
Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
100. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
101. See The Most Important Zoning Opinion Since Euclid in 49 PLANNING 10 (November 1983).
102. See, e.g., Willistown, 462 Pa. at 449, 341 A.2d at 468 (1975). See generally Surrick, 476 Pa. at 190, 382 A.2d at 109 (1977).
103. 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mt. Laurel II). In this case, the New Jersey
Supreme Court expanded the doctrine enunciated in Mt. Laurel I, which required that municipal land use regulations provide realistic opportunities for low and moderate income
housing, by requiring the elimination of restrictions to the construction of low and moderate
income housing, and by providing for affirmative governmental devices to make opportunities to construct them more realistic. Id. at 217, 456 A.2d at 419. See supra note 99.
104. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
105. 92 N.J. at 214-20, 456 A.2d at 418-21.
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has an affirmative obligation to guide developers toward that
end-the concept of "inclusionary zoning."' 6
The inevitable conclusion is that the decisions in Kravitz and
Elocin are in conflict with the opinion rendered by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Mt. Laurel II. The determination by the court
that townhouses are simply another design type which need not be
provided for in an ordinance that provides for apartment units,
seems to upset the balance among zoning litigants by favoring
those within the community who would limit the housing options
provided for moderate and low income persons searching for a
place to live. In Mt. Laurel II, New Jersey's highest court took an
unprecedented activist position in promoting the interests of the
unrepresented party who would occupy a particular housing development if it were built.107 Whether or not this emphasis on "inclusionary" techniques will effectively eliminate exclusionary zoning
problems in New Jersey without over-burdening the court system
and placing an inequitable cost on its citizens remains to be seen.
It is submitted that the most practical approach to defining the
fair share doctrine would be to re-establish a middle ground between the activism of Mt. Laurel II and the passivity of Kravitz
and Elocin. Kravitz and Elocin mark the reentry of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court into the exclusionary zoning arena and mark a
sharp departure from the middle ground approach employed by
the supreme court in Surrick and the commonwealth court in two
recent decisions'0 8 which appear to follow the Camp Hill and Appeal of Olson rationale.
John R. Hanlon, Jr.

106. Id. at 260-78, 456 A.2d at 442-52. The Mt. Laurel II court provided the following
summarization of the concept:
The most commonly used inclusionary zoning techniques are incentive zoning and
mandatory set-asides. The former involves economic incentives to a developer
through the relaxation of various restrictions of an ordinance (typically density limits) in exchange for the construction of certain amounts of low and moderate income
units. The latter, a mandatory set-aside, is basically a requirement that developers
include a minimum amount of lower income housing in their projects.
Id. at 266, 456 A.2d at 445.
107. See Case Law Review and Commentary, 8 ENVIRONMENTAL CURRENTS 8 (Summer
1983).
108. See generally Caste v. Zoning Hearing Board, 70 Pa. Commw. 368, 453 A.2d 69
(1982). See also Appeal of Kasorex, 70 Pa. Commw. 193, 452 A.2d 921 (1982).

